I introduce a new axiom for power indices on the domain of …nite simple games that requires the total power of any given pair i; j of players in any given game v to be equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some single player k in some game w: I show that the Banzhaf power index is uniquely characterized by this new "equivalence to individual power" axiom in conjunction with the standard semivalue axioms: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, positivity (which is strengthened to avoid zeroing-out of the index on some games), and dummy. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C71, D72.
, is easier to describe -the voting power of a participant is de…ned as the probability that he is a "swinger", i.e., that his "yes" vote changes the voting outcome, when all other individuals cast their votes independently and with equal probability for "yes" and "no". If, as suggested by Shapley and Shubik (1954) , the voting situation is modelled as a simple cooperative game with a …nite player set N , the BI of player i 2 N is given by his probability to turn a random coalition of players from losing to winning by joining it, assuming that the coalition is chosen with respect to the uniform distribution over the subsets of N nfig.
Naturally, other probability distributions over the subsets of N nfig can be considered, one of which leads to the famous SSI, introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1954) .
The SSI is induced by the uniform distribution over all strict orderings of N , and player i's voting power is de…ned as the probability of him being pivotal in a random order (that is, the probability that by joining the coalition of his predecessors in a random order, i switches it from losing to winning). A major distinctive feature of SSI is its e¢ ciency -namely, the total power of all players is 1 in any simple game. 1 In contrast, BI is not e¢ cient in general. The total power in a game is equal to the expected number of "swingers" in that game. The latter property has been elevated to the rank of an axiom by Dubey and Shapley (1979) as a substitute for e¢ ciency, in an attempt to provide BI with an axiomatic foundation that would mirror that of SSI (established in Dubey (1975) ).
The Dubey and Shapley axiom may be deemed unsatisfactory, 2 however, not least because it explicitly relies on counting "swings" (the notion on which BI is based).
Fortunately, BI has other distinguishing features that can replace this axiom, of which we shall mention just two. The composition property, that was formally de…ned and proved by Owen (1975 Owen ( , 1978 , pertains to a two-tier voting process, and requires the power of player i in a compound voting game to be equal 3 to the product of i's power in the …rst-tier game in which he participates and the power of i's delegate 1 In this paper we adopt the Dubey and Shapley (1979) notion of a simple game, that requires the grand coalition N to be winning, and the game to be monotonic (i.e., a winning coalition must remain winning if joined by one or more players). 2 See e.g. Section 5 in Dubey et al. (2005) . 3 To be precise, a second-tier game needs to be decisive (namely, a winning coalition must have a losing complement in N , and vice versa) for the composition property to hold.
in the second-tier game. 4 Another distinctive property of BI is 2-e¢ ciency. It was established in Lehrer (1988) and requires the sum of the power of any two players, i and j, in any game v to be equal to the power of player i in the game v i;j obtained from v by "merging" j into i (i.e., any coalition that contains i in the game v i;j has the same worth as the coalition that contains both i and j in the game v).
The 2-e¢ ciency property is quite powerful. Lehrer (1988) showed that any 2-e¢ cient power index that coincides with BI on the set of all 2-player simple games is, in fact, identical to the BI on all games. But 2-e¢ ciency is also powerful enough to be a basis for an axiomatization of BI that does not contain an explicit or implicit comparison to BI on certain games. Lehrer (1988) considered a weaker version of 2-e¢ ciency, which he termed the superadditivity axiom, whereby the total power of any i,j in any v does not exceed the power of the merged player i in v i;j : Lehrer proved that BI is uniquely characterized by the superadditivity axiom, along with other requirements that are routinely imposed 5 on power indices (these are the transfer, equal treatment or symmetry, and dummy axioms). 6 Recently, Casajus (2012) showed that the symmetry axiom is not needed in Lehrer's characterization of BI (but the three remaining axioms are logically independent). That is, superadditivity, transfer and dummy axioms uniquely characterize BI on the set of …nite simple games.
In this work we introduce a new axiom, equivalence to individual power (EIP), that is related to 2-e¢ ciency but has an independent conceptual appeal. The EIP axiom is based on the idea that when trying to conceptualize the collective power of a pair of players, one need not leave the realm where only the individual power is de…ned, as the collective power has an ordinal equivalent in that realm. Formally, EIP postulates that, given any two players i; j 2 N and a simple game v on N; the total power of the pair i; j in v is equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some (single) player k in some simple game w: Only one mild assumption 4 A composition property-based axiomatization of the BI on the domain of simple games appeared in Dubey et al. (2005) . 5 See Dubey (1975) , Dubey and Shapley (1979) , Einy (1987) . 6 The superadditivity and 2-e¢ ciency also …gure prominently in axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value (BV), the extension of BI to the set of all games on N: Lehrer's (1988) Theorem B establishes a characterization of BV that is identical to that of BI, with the linearity axiom instead of transfer.
See also the works of Nowak (1997) and Casajus (2011 Casajus ( , 2012 , where the linearity axiom is replaced by versions of Young's (1985) monotonicity.
links w to the original game v: w should have the same -or smaller -carrier compared to v: There need not be any other relation between w and v: Thus, according to EIP, the "language" of individual power must be su¢ ciently "expressive" to also be able to capture the total power of pairs; in mathematical terms, the union of the image sets of all players'individual power indices must be su¢ ciently rich so as to contain the image sets of all 2-sums of individual power indices.
The usual formulations of the 2-e¢ ciency property (such as those in Lehrer (1988 Our main result (Theorem 1) is that BI is the only power index that satis…es the EIP axiom together with the standard set of four "semivalue axioms" (the term comes from Einy (1987) , who calls power indices satisfying the four axioms semivalues on simple games). The set contains the transfer, symmetry, and dummy axioms that have already been mentioned, and the positivity axiom that, in addition to the standard requirement of non-negativity of the power index for all players, stipulates that positive power must be attributed to at least one player in a game. 8 We then
show, using arguments similar to those of Malawski (2002) , that a weaker equal 7 The axiomatization in Theorem 5 of Casajus (2012) that removes the symmetry axiom from
Lehrer's list also holds for games with a …xed player set N , assuming jN j 3: 8 Without the latter requirement, our result would not hold as is explained in Remark 2(4).
treatment property can replace the symmetry in our set of axioms (see Corollary 1).
Our …ve axioms are independent when there are at least three players (see Remark 2). Thus, the EIP axiom is "permissive" not only in appearance -it is strictly weaker than 2-e¢ ciency because the latter uniquely characterizes BI combined with just three semivalue axioms (positivity excepted) by Lehrer (1988) . 9 However, we also point out that the weakening of EIP that only bounds the total power of a pair from above by some individual power cannot replace EIP in our axiomatization (because then the SSI would satisfy all the axioms, see Remark 2(1)), unlike superadditivity in the axiomatization of Lehrer (1988) that was substitutable for the stronger 2-e¢ ciency.
Furthermore, the EIP axiom cannot be a basis for an axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf value on the set of all games on N , as then the all-games version of EIP would be satis…ed by every semivalue (see Remark 4).
Simple Games and the Banzhaf Index
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the player set, that will be …xed throughout. 
The domain SG(N ) G(N ) of simple games on N consists of all v 2 G such that
if S T then v(S) v(T ):
A coalition S is said to be winning in v 2 SG(N ) if v(S) = 1; and losing otherwise.
The set of simple games (respectively, all games) with carrier T N will be denoted by SG (T ) (respectively G (T )): Given a non-empty set T N; denote by u T 2 SG(T ) the unanimity game with carrier T; i.e., the game for which T is the (only) minimal winning coalition. 9 In fact, as the above-mentioned result of Casajus (2012) holds when the player set N is …xed and jN j 3, the transfer and dummy axioms alone can uniquely characterize the BI in conjunction with 2-e¢ ciency.
A power index is a mapping ' : SG(N ) !R n . For each i 2 N and v 2 SG(N ); the i th coordinate of ' (v) 2 R n ; ' (v) (i); is interpreted as the voting power of player i in the game v: The Banzhaf index (henceforth BI) and the Shapley-Shubik index (henceforth SSI) are among the best known power indices. In this article we focus on the former. The BI is given for each v 2 SG(N ) and i 2 N by
Thus, for each i 2 N , (v) (i) is the expected marginal contribution of player i to a random coalition, chosen w.r.t. the uniform distribution on subsets of N n fig :
Equivalently, (v) (i) is the probability that the random coalition is losing in v but becomes winning if joined by i. (The SSI is given by a modi…cation of (1), where in each summand the coe¢ cient 
The Axioms
We shall show that is the unique power index on SG(N ) which satis…es the …ve axioms below. The …rst axiom is new. It postulates that the total power of a pair of players, as measured by the index, is equivalent to some individual power. To be precise, the sum of power indices of any two given players in a game is required to be equal to the power index of some player in some game with the same carrier (that need not be related in any other way to the original game).
Axiom I: Equivalence to individual power (EIP). If T N and v 2 SG(T ),
then for every two distinct players i; j 2 T there exist k 2 T and w 2 SG(T ) such that
EIP is related to the superadditivity (SA) and 2-e¢ ciency (2-EF) axioms introduced by Lehrer (1988) for his characterization of the BI. Given T N; i; j 2 T and v 2 SG(T ); the two axioms compare the sum ' (v) (i)+' (v) (j) with ' (v i;j ) (i); where
any S N nfig (i.e., in v i;j the two distinct players i; j are "merged" into a single player, i). SA requires that
2-EF requires (3) to hold with equality. (In our rendering of SA and 2-EF we follow the interpretation of Casajus (2012) , in that the new entity created by the merger of i and j retains the name i; however, in order to keep the player set N unchanged, in accordance with our basic assumption, j is assumed not to leave the game but to remain as a null player 10 .)
It is clear that EIP is weaker than 2-EF, as an equality in (3) 
i.e., that the change in power depends only on the change in the voting game. The positivity requirement is natural, as it is hard to imagine how a negative power could be associated with a player who can never make matters worse by joining a group. Since every v 2 SG(N ) is monotonic by assumption, no player can indeed turn a winning coalition into a losing one by joining it. Similarly, as the grand coalition N is by assumption a winning coalition in any v 2 SG(N ), winning is possible, hence the expectation that positive power should be attributed to at least one player. 
The Results
Our main result is the following theorem. Theorem 1. There exists one, and only one, power index satisfying EIP, T, S, P, and D, and it is the BI:
Proof. As mentioned in Remark 1, satis…es EIP, and it is well known that also satis…es the semivalue axioms T, S, P, and D. It remains to show that our …ve axioms uniquely determine : To this end, …x any power index ' that satis…es EIP, T, S, P, and D. On account of the last four axioms, ' is a semivalue on SG(N ), and so Theorem 2.4 of Einy (1987) applies 11 . Thus, there is a unique extension of ' 
s=0 of non-negative numbers satisfying
such that for every v 2 G(T )
(By the symmetry of ' and the fact that (p
s=0 is independent of the choice of T with jT j = t.) In particular, for every v 2 SG(N ) with carrier T N of size t;
Now …x t; 1 t n 1: Since G(f1; 2; :::; tg) G(f1; 2; :::; t + 1g), (5) can be applied (with t + 1 instead of t) to any v 2 G(f1; 2; :::; tg) when the latter is viewed as a game with carrier T = f1; 2; :::t + 1g. This yields
But as the collection (p 
We will next show by induction on t that 
For t = 1 the claim follows from (4), as then p 1 0 = 1: Now assume that (8) has been established for t = m; 1 m < n: We will show that it also holds for t = m + 1:
Combining the induction hypothesis (8) with (7) for t = m yields where (recall) u T denotes the unanimity game with carrier T: Using (6) and (4) for t = m + 1, we obtain
and
By EIP, there exist games v 3 ; v 4 2 SG(f1; 2; :::; m + 1g) and players k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; mg such that
It is immediate from (6) and (4) that ' (v 3 ) (k) ; ' (v 4 ) (l) 1: Hence,
Using (10) and (11), we obtain
In what follows we consider two cases.
Case 1:
The integer m is odd. Using the notation in (9), the inequalities in (13) become 1 q + p 1 and 1 p + q 1; and hence p = q: The equalities in (9) now establish (8) for t = m + 1:
The integer m is even. Using the notation in (9), both inequalities in (13) lead to a single inequality
Assume …rst that 1 p+q < 1: Consider again the games v 1 ; v 3 2 SG(f1; 2; :::; m+1g) used above. Using (10), the notation in (9), and (12), we obtain
This means that
since otherwise k would be a dictator (who is also a dummy player) in the monotonic game v 3 ; and by Axiom D he would receive ' (v 3 ) (k) = v 3 (fkg) = 1 in contradiction to (15) . But then, using (6) and (4) for t = m + 1;
no matter which of the two equalities in (16) hold: Since q 0 by its de…nition in ; the combination of (15) and (17) yields q = 0:
Consider the 2-majority game v 2;m+1 2 SG(f1; 2; :::; m + 1g) in which the set of minimal winning coalitions consists of all subsets of f1; 2; :::; m + 1g of size 2. Then, by (6) and the notation in (9), for every i = 1; 2; :::; m + 1,
Therefore ' (v 2;m+1 ) is the zero vector, which contradicts the second requirement in Axiom P. This shows that there can be no strict inequality in (14) , and hence
The equalities in (9) now establish (8) for t = m + 1:
The treatment of cases 1 and 2 completes the induction step, and establishes (8) for every t n; and in particular for t = n: The combination of (6) and (8) for t = n and a comparison with (1) now shows that ' = :
Remark 2 (Independence of the axioms when n 3). Our axioms, EIP, T, S, P, and D, are independent when there are at least three players, as we show below.
1. The SSI satis…es all the axioms except EIP. Notice also that EIP cannot be weakened by requiring inequality " " in (2) instead of equality. 13 Indeed, the SSI satis…es this weaker version of EIP, and so the weaker version, combined with the other axioms, would not uniquely characterize :
2. Consider a power index ' on SG(N ) that is equal to for all games in SG(N );
with the exception of v = u f1;2g ; for which ' (v) = and ' is e¢ cient.) The index ' satis…es all the axioms except S.
4. Let ' be given, for any v 2 SG(N ) and i 2 N; by
It is easy to see that ' satis…es EIP, T, S, and D. However, ' violates P. To see this, notice that due to the assumption that n 3; ' (v) is the zero vector for v = v 2;n ; where v 2;n is the 2-majority game supported on N (in which the minimal winning coalitions are precisely those of size 2). Notice further that satis…es all the axioms except D. 13 Had EIP been stated with inequality " " in (2), it would be implied (i.e. be weaker than) the SA axiom of Lehrer (1988) .
Remark 3 (Redundancy of some axioms when n 2). When n = 1; there is only one power index on (the unique game in) SG(f1g); by D. When n 2; Axiom P can be dropped from the list of axioms characterizing : Indeed, take any power index ' on SG(f1; 2g) = fu f1g ; u f2g ; u f1;2g ; u f1g _ u f2g g: By D, ' u f1g = u f1g = (1; 0)
and ' u f2g = u f2g = (0; 1); and by S ' u f1;2g = (a; a) and ' u f1g _ u f2g = (b; b) for some a; b: By T,
hence a + b = 1: If a 0 then b 1; and ' fails EIP for the game v = u f1g _ u f2g
because the total power of players 1 and 2, 2b 2; cannot be matched by any individual power: We conclude that a > 0; and, similarly, that b > 0: Thus ' does in fact satisfy P, and so by our theorem ' = .
Remark 4 (Theorem 1 cannot be extended to axiomatize the Banzhaf value on the set of all games). Formula (1), when applied to every v 2 G(N ), de…nes the Banzhaf value : G(N ) !R n on the entire G(N ). However, EIP, were it to be stated for all games in G(N ) and not just for simple games, would lose all its strength. Indeed, for any semivalue ' de…ned by (5) (for t = n and a collection
s=0 that is subject to (4)), the range of the individual value mapping ' (w) (k) -with variable w 2 G(N ) and …xed k 2 N -is the entire R.
14 Thus, given any v 2 G(N ) and i; j 2 N; for any semivalue ' there exists a game w ' 2 G(N ) such that
This shows that adding EIP to the set of semivalue axioms (which are extensions of T, S, P, and D to solutions on G(N )) will not in any way narrow down the set of semivalues.
We shall …nally note that in our axiomatization of BI Axiom S can be replaced by its following well-known weaker version: Proof. We will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given S; T N such that jSj = jT j 1;
' (u S ) (i) = ' (u T ) (j) for any i 2 S and j 2 T;
and ' (u S ) (i) = ' (u T ) (j) = 0 for any i 2 N nS and j 2 N nT:
Proof of Lemma 1. Equality (19) follows from D as any player outside some carrier of a game is a dummy (null) player.
Denote s := jSj = jT j : If S = T then (18) is implied by ET. Consider next the case where S 6 = T but the two sets have all but two players in common (i.e. jS \ T j = s 1), which means that S = R [ fi 0 g and T = R [ fj 0 g for some i 0 2 N , j 0 2 N;
and R N nfi 0 ; j 0 g: As all ' (u S ) (i) (respectively, all ' (u T ) (j)) are equal for i 2 S (respectively, j 2 T ) by ET, in order to establish the equality in (18) it su¢ ces to show that ' (u S ) (i 0 ) = ' (u T ) (j 0 ): By T,
In both u S _ u T = u R[fi 0 g _ u R[fj 0 g and u S^uT = u R[fi 0 ;j 0 g the players i 0 and j 0 are substitutes, and hence by ET and (20)
Using (19), the above equality turns into ' (u S ) (i 0 ) = ' (u T ) (j 0 ) ; which establishes (18) when jS \ T j = s 1. For general S and T of the same size s, a chain of s-sized coalitions between S and T can be found such that any two consecutive coalitions in the chain have all but two players in common (and to whom the above argument applies), and hence (18) holds for any S and T of size s:
Now let ' be the power index given by
for every v 2 SG(N ) and i 2 N: It is easy to check that ' satis…es S, and it also satis…es T as ' does so. By its de…nition and the properties established in Lemma 1, ' coincides with ' on the collection (u T ) ?6 =T N of all unanimity games in SG(N ):
Any v 2 SG(N ) can be written as a maximum of a …nite number of unanimity games:
where ( 1)
and by applying (21) to '; ' and using the fact that both coincide on all unanimity games, we obtain ' (v) = ' (v) : As this holds for every v 2 SG(N ); ' = '. But ' satis…es S as has been noted earlier.
It is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 that ET can replace S in our axiomatization of BI:
Corollary 1. BI is the only power index that satis…es EIP, T, ET, P, and D:
